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I. INTRODUCTION
In 1975 Congress passed the Education for All Handicapped Chil-
dren Act (EAHCA) to provide funds that would encourage states to
ensure an education for handicapped children.1 Congress declared the
purpose of the Act to be:
[To assure that all handicapped children have available to them ... a free
appropriate public education which emphasizes special education and related
services designed to meet their unique needs, to assure that the rights of hand-
icapped children and their parents or guardians are protected, to assist States
and localities to provide for the education of all handicapped children, and to
assess and assure the effectiveness of efforts to educate handicapped
children.2
Implementation of the Act has spawned numerous administrative and
legal actions. Generally, the parent of the handicapped child has re-
quested services, damages, and/or attorneys' fees that the state feels
its own regulatory interpretations of the Act do not require it to
provide.3
The Supreme Court gave its first interpretation of a provision of
the EAHCA in 1982 in Hendrick Hudson District Board of Education
v. Rowley.4 At issue in Rowley were definitions of the "free appropri-
ate public education" guaranteed to handicapped children by the
EAHCA, and the role of the courts when an "individualized educa-
tional program" (IEP)5 approved by state educational authorities is ap-
1. 20 U.S.C. §§ 1401-61 (1982). See also The Education Amendments of 1974, Pub. L.
No. 93-380, 88 Stat. 580.
Congress first became involved with educating handicapped children in 1966
when it amended the Elementary and Secondary Education Act of 1965 to pro-
vide grants to assist states in initiating and improving programs for education of
the handicapped. Pub. L. No. 89-750, § 161, 80 Stat. 1204 (1966). In 1970, that
legislation was replaced by the Education for the Handicapped Act, Pub. L. No.
91-230, 84 Stat. 175 (1970), which contained a similar grant program to encourage
the States to provide programs, educational resources, and trained personnel for
educating handicapped children. In 1974 Congress determined that additional
federal impetus and assistance were needed to enable the states to meet handi-
capped children's needs and passed Pub. L. No. 93-380, 88 Stat. 579 (1974), for the
first time requiring states to set goals for providing full educational opportunities
to all handicapped children as a prerequisite to receiving federal funds. For a
history of legislative action in passing the EAHCA, see Note, Enforcing the Right
to an "Appropriate" Education: The Education for All Handicapped Children
Act of 1975, 92 HARv. L. REv. 1103 (1979).
2. 20 U.S.C. § 1401(c) (1976). See also Hendrick Hudson Dist. Bd. of Educ. v.
Rowley, 458 U.S. 176, 179 (1982) ("The Act represents an ambitious federal effort
to promote the education of handicapped children .....
3. See infra note 30.
4. 458 U.S. 176 (1982).
5. The term "Individualized Educational Program" means a written statement pre-
pared by qualified educational representatives, a child's teacher, parents or
guardian, and the child when appropriate, setting forth an instructional plan spe-
cially designed to meet that handicapped child's unique needs. The IEP is to in-
clude: (1) the child's entry level of performance; (2) annual goals and short-term
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pealed. Unfortunately, the Rowley decision spawned as many
questions as it answered, and left unexamined other basic and contro-
versial provisions of the Act.
6
Among the questions continuing to generate conflicts among state
agencies, schools, and the handicapped students they serve has been
the scope and type of support services that schools must provide. That
issue reached the Supreme Court in the spring of 1984 in Irving In-
dependent School District v. Tatro.7 The court held that the EAHCA's
promise to provide the "related services"S necessary for a handicapped
child to benefit from her guaranteed education 9 obligates a school sys-
tem to provide catheterization' 0 services to a child born with a condi-
tion preventing voluntary emptying of the bladder." Following upon
the Court's decision in Rowley, which limited the rights of the handi-
capped under the EAHCA,12 and the Court's decision the same day as
Tatro to disallow recovery of attorneys' fees in actions to secure appro-
priate education,13 the unanimous opinion granting CIC support serv-
ices to Amber Tatro was surprising.
This Article will examine briefly the Supreme Court's decisions
construing the EAHCA prior to Tatro, analyze the Court's contribu-
tion to EAHCA interpretation in Tatro, and, finally, consider issues
that remain troublesome to handicapped students and schools. The
Tatro opinion has shed some light on the post-Rowley murkiness sur-
rounding what will constitute sufficient benefit from special educa-
tion, and regarding challengeability of state officials' determinations
of what is beneficial education in a particular case. However, a
number of questions remain. Despite the seeming gain in right to edu-
instructional objectives; (3) the extent to which the child can be served in the
regular classrom and educational services to be provided to achieve objectives and
goals; (4) a date for initiation of the program and its projected duration; and
(5) evaluation procedures to determine whether instructional objectives and goals
are being reached. See 20 U.S.C. § 1401(19) (1982).
6. See generally Note, Are Handica'ped Children Entitled to Equal Educational Op-
portunities?, 20 CAT. W.L. REV. 132 (1983); Note, Landmark, Roadblock or An-
other Signpost on the Road to State Courts?, 16 CONN. L. REv. 149 (1983)
[hereinafter cited as Note, Landmark]; Note, A Confusion of Rights and Reme-
dies: Tatro v. Tesas, 14 CoNN. L. REv. 585 (1982); Note, Utter Chaos, 12 J. L. &
EDuc. 233 (1983); Note, Crippling the Education for All Handicapped Children
Act, 12 STETSON L. REv. 791 (1983) [hereinafter cited as Note, Crippling]; Note,
Building an Appropriate Education From Board of Education v. Rowley: Raring
the Door and Raising the Floor, 42 MD. L. REv. 466 (1983); Note, What's Left
After Rowley?, 19 WnLAM E L. REV. 715 (1983).
7. 104 S. Ct. 3371 (1984).
8. See infra text accompanying note 19.
9. See infra note 12 and accompanying text.
10. See infra note 70.
11. Hendrick Hudson Dist. Bd. of Educ. v. Rowley, 458 U.S. 176 (1982).
12. See supra note 6.
13. Smith v. Robinson, 104 S. Ct. 3457 (1984).
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cational support services made in Tatro, the decision in fact provides a
mere doorstopper to the schoolhouse door opened so narrowly in
Rowley.14 A juxtaposition of the decisions still reveals the Court to be
more protective of state finances and school districts than of opportu-
nities for handicapped students.
II. BACKGROUND: THE EAHCA AND SUPREME COURT
INTERPRETATION PRIOR TO TATRO
A. The EAHCA
To receive federal funds to supplement its expenditures for the ed-
ucation of handicapped children, a state must outline procedures it
will undertake to assure a free appropriate public education to all
handicapped children.'5 The EAHCA defines "free appropriate public
education" as "special education and related services" that are pro-
vided at public expense and under public supervision, meet the state
educational agency's standards for preschool, elementary, or secon-
dary school, and conform to the requirements of the individual educa-
tional program 16 prepared for the individual handicapped child.17
"Special education" is defined as instruction (at no cost to parents
or guardians) specially designed to meet the unique needs of a handi-
capped child.18 The term "related services" means:
transportation, and such developmental, corrective, and other supportive serv-
ices (including speech pathology and audiology, psychological services, physi-
cal and occupational therapy, recreation, and medical and counseling services,
except that such medical services shall be for diagnostic and evaluation pur-
poses only) as may be required to assist a handicapped child to benefit from
special education, and includes the early identification and assessment of
handicapping conditions in children.1 9
While school districts are required to provide special education to
handicapped children at home or in hospitals or institutions when nec-
14. See Hendrick Hudson Dist. Bd. of Educ. v. Rowley, 458 U.S. 176, 192 (1982)
("[T]he intent of the Act was more to open the door of public education to handi-
capped children ... than to guarantee any particular level of education once
inside.").
15. See 20 U.S.C. § 1412(1), (2) (1982).
16. See supra note 5 and accompanying text.
17. See 20 U.S.C. § 1401(18) (1982), which provides that:
The term "free appropriate public education" means special education
and related services which (A) have been provided at public expense,
under public supervision and direction, and without charge, (B) meet the
standards of the State educational agency, (C) include an appropriate
preschool, elementary, or secondary school education in the State in-
volved, and (D) are provided in conformity with the individualized edu-
cation program required under section 1414(a)(5) of this title.
18. See id. at § 1401(16).
19. Id. at § 1401(17).
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essary,20 the intent of the special education and related services re-
quirement is to enable handicapped children to attend regular classes
in neighborhood schools, with the schools responsible for modifying
environments and programs to make such "mainstreaming" possi-
ble.21 Special classes or schools are only an option when the nature or
severity of a handicap prevents instructional goals from being
achieved with the aid of related services in a regular classroom. 22
The EAHCA also offers detailed procedures through which a par-
ent or guardian of a handicapped child may invoke administrative and
judicial review of the child's educational program.23 To the parents'
right to participate in the development of their child's annual IEP,24
the "procedural safeguards" add the rights to: examine records re-
garding their child's evaluation and placement, and secure an in-
dependent evaluation;2 5 receive prior written notification when a
change in their child's evaluation or placement is proposed or refused
by the educational agency 26 present complaints with respect to the
education of their child in an impartial due process hearing conducted
by the local, intermediate, or state educational agency;2 7 and appeal a
lower agency finding to a higher agency.2 8 A parent or guardian dis-
satisfied with the results of an administrative review may bring a civil
action in either state or federal court.
2 9
Despite Congress' attempted definition of major terms of the
EAHCA, vague language used within those very definitions39 has
prompted persistent disagreement regarding inclusiveness, scope, and
specific application of the EAHCA's guarantees. 3 '
20. See id. at § 1401(16).
21. The state must assure that the child is placed in the least restrictive environment.
To the maximum extent possible the handicapped child is to be educated in the
regular classroom with nonhandicapped children. Id. at § 1412(5)(B). In other
words, the child is to be "mainstreamed." Congress first sanctioned the practice
of mainstreaming as a means to integrate the handicapped in the Education
Amendments of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-380, 88 Stat. 484.
22. See 20 U.S.C. § 1412(5)(B) (1982).
23. See id. at § 1415.
24. See id. at § 1401(19).
25. See id. at § 1415(b)(1)(A) (1982).
26. See id. at 1415(b)(1)(C).
27. See id. at §§ 1415(b)(1)(E), 1415(b)(2), 1415(d).
28. See id. at §§ 1415(c), 1415(e).
29. See id. at §§ 1415(e)(2), 1415(e)(4).
30. There are several reasons for the lack of specificity in EAHCA definitions other
than oversight. These may include Congress' recognition that education is pri-
marily a state and local concern, that handicapped children evince a tremendous
variety of needs, and that educators themselves do not agree upon what programs
are most effective. See Note, supra note 1, at 1108-09.
31. For example, the phrase "free appropriate public education" had been inter-
preted variously by courts. See, eg., Kruelle v. New Castle School Dist., 642 F.2d
687 (3d Cir. 1981) (appropriate education means realization of the individual
child's learning potential). But see Springdale School Dist. No. 50 v. Grace, 656
1985]
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B. Hendrick Hudson District Board of Education v. Rowley
The Supreme Court's first attempt at clarifying provisions of the
F.2d 300, 304 (8th Cir. 1981) (appropriate education means that handicapped child
must be given opportunity to achieve full potential commensurate with appor-
tunity provided other children), cert denied, 103 S. Ct. 2086 (1983). See also
Gladys J. v. Pearland Indep. School Dist., 520 F. Supp. 869, 875 (S.D. Tex. 1981)
(appropriate education is one that provides opportunity to achieve full potential
equal to that provided nonhandicapped children); Armstrong v. Kline, 476 F.
Supp. 583, 603 (E.D. Pa. 1979), remanded sub nom. Battle v. Pennsylvania, 629
F.2d 269 (3d Cir. 1980), cert. denied sub nom. Scanlon v. Battle, 452 U.S. 968 (1980)
(Congress intended that each handicapped child achieve self-sufficiency). But see
Pinkerton v. Moye, 509 F. Supp. 107 (W.D. Va. 1981) (maximization of potential to
the extent possible is the meaning of appropriate education).
The phrase "related services" has been tested in many different jurisdictions.
See, e.g., Department of Educ. v. Katherine D., 727 F.2d 809 (9th Cir. 1984) (school
must provide trained person to maintain tracheostomy tube); Tokarcik v. Forest
Hills School Dist., 665 F.2d 443 (3d Cir. 1981) (catheterization must be provided as
related service), cert denied, 458 U.S. 1121 (1982); Kruelle v. New Castle County
School Dist., 489 F. Supp. 169 (D. Del. 1980) (when educational and medical needs
seem unseverable, medical services must be provided to assist the child to benefit
from special education), affd, 642 F.2d 687 (3d Cir. 1981). See also Cohen v.
School Bd., 1984-85 E.H.L.R. Dec. 556:162 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. June 5, 1984) (round
trip transportation for parents to visit child in residential facility three times per
year is related service); Woods v. Pittman, 3 E.H.L.R. 552:442 (N.D. Miss. June 17,
1981) (services provided by nurses are related rather than medical).
See also In re Educ. Assignment of Dwight W., 1984-85 E.H.L.R. Dec. 506:138
(Pa. State Educ. Agency Case No. 232 June 14, 1984) (speech therapy is a related
servive); In re Los Angeles Unified School Dist., 3 E.H.L.R. 502:321 (Cal. State
Educ. Agency Dec. No. 20 July 8,1981) (autistic child requires sensory integration
therapy as a related service); In re Robin S., 3 E.H.L.R. 502:232 (Ga. State Educ.
Agency Dec. No. 1980-31 Jan. 13, 1980) (visual computer and optometric services
not necessary for visually handicapped child to benefit from education); Joseph
L. v. Boston Pub. Schools, 3 E.H.L.R. 501:133 (Mass. State Educ. Agency Dec. No.
1554 Jan. 25, 1979) (music therapy is a related service required for autistic child);
In re Capistrano USD, 3 E.H.L.R. 502:129 (Cal. State Educ. Agency Dec. No.
SH.176 July 25, 1980) (detoxification is related service required for student to
benefit from education); Cal. State Educ. Agency Dec. No. 107, 3 E.H.L.R. 502:101
(June 11, 1980) (myofunctional therapy not a required related service when not
necessary for child to receive benefit from special education).
Whether psychological services are "related services" is unsettled. See Max
M. v. Thompson, 1984-85 E.H.L.R. Dec. 556:227 (N.D. IM. Aug. 13 1984) (psycho-
therapy and similar services that can be provided by psychologists, social workers,
or guidance counselors are related services, but services of a psychiatrist are med-
ical services). But see In re Lorrie v. Natick Pub. Schools, 3 E.H.L.R. 501:366
(Mass. State Educ. Agency Dec. No. 2309 1980).
Jurisdictions also disagree on whether physical or occupational therapy is a
"related service." See In re Lori B., 1984-85 E.H.L.R. Dec. 506:101 (Sept. 16, 1983)
(occupational and physical therapy are related services for child with orthopedic
impairment). But see In re Solana Beach Elem. School Dist., 1984-85 E.H.L.R.
Dec. 506:189 (Cal. State Educ. Agency Dec. No. SE 84242 June 19, 1984) (occupa-
tional therapy not required when student is making progress in motor skills and
is successful in academic program); Thomas B. v. Radnor Township School Dist.,
3 E.H.L.R. 502:176 (Pa. State Educ. Agency Dec. No. 147 Sept. 5, 1980) (while
SCHOOL HEALTH SERVICES
EAHCA was less than complete.32 In Rowley the Court held that a
deaf child was receiving an "appropriate education" without the sign
language interpreter her parents requested. The Court's decision was
based on the fact that instruction in a regular classroom with an FM
hearing aid, supplemented by work with a speech therapist and a tutor
for the hearing impaired,33 was allowing her to achieve higher than
average marks and to pass easily from grade to grade.
3 4
When Amy Rowley began first grade, a new annual IEP was pre-
pared for her by school personnel as required by the EAHCA.35 The
IEP provided that Amy be educated in the regular classrom, aided by
the supportive services of an FM transmitter and hearing aid, a tutor
for the deaf, and a speech therapist.3 6 Amy's parents requested that
Amy also be provided the services of a sign-language interpreter.3 7
When their request and two administrative appeals were denied,38 the
Rowleys brought a civil action claiming that, because Amy would not
obtain the fullest benefit from her education without an interpreter,
she was being denied the "free appropriate public education" the
EAHCA guarantees. 39 The Supreme Court granted certiorari with
the dual purposes of clarifying the substantive meaning of "free appro-
priate public education," and answering the procedural question of
whether courts may change decisions and policies of state educational
agencies when parents have voiced complaints about the substance of
their child's special education via a civil action.40
some children could require special physical education, physically impaired child
functioning capably in regular physical education class did not require special
physical education at elementary school level).
32. See infra note 52 and accompanying text. See also supra note 6 and accompany-
ing text.
33. Hendrick Hudson Dist. Bd. of Educ. v. Rowley, 458 U.S. 176, 184 (1982).
34. Id. at 204.
35. Id at 184. See also 20 U.S.C. § 1401(19) (1982).
36. Hendrick Hudson Dist. Bd. of Educ. v. Rowley, 458 U.S. 176, 184 (1982).
37. Id.
38. Id. at 185.
39. Id.
40. Id. at 186. Parents' right to bring a civil action is provided in EAHCA
§ 1415(e)(2). The U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York had
interpreted "a free appropriate public education" as giving a handicapped child
"an opportunity to achieve full potential commensurate with the opportunity pro-
vided to other children.. ." and ordered the school district to provide the inter-
preter. Rowley v. Board of Educ., 483 F. Supp. 528, 529 (S.D.N.Y. 1980). The
Court of Appeals agreed with the standard applied by the District Court and af-
firmed. Rowley v. Board of Educ., 632 F.2d 945, 947 (2d Cir. 1980). Judge Mans-
field dissented, however, on two bases: that "appropriate education" does not
require equal educational opportunity, and that courts do not have the expertise
in educational matters to redesign a child's educational program and should ac-
cept the judgment of educational authorities. Id. at 951-53 (Mansfield, J.,
dissenting).
1985]
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1. The Court's Definition of "Appropriate Education"
The Rowleys contended that the statutory definition of "free ap-
propriate public education" was not functional because it did not de-
fine "appropriate."41 The Court disagreed and held that the four
requirements listed in the EAHCA definition were Congress' check-
list for adequacy. A child's special education and related services are
appropriate when they: (1) are provided at public expense and under
public supervision; (2) meet state educational agency standards; (3) in-
clude appropriate preschool, elementary, or secondary school educa-
tion as normally required in that state; and (4) conform to the child's
IEP.42 The Court concluded that "if personalized instruction is being
provided with sufficient supportive services to permit the child to ben-
efit from the instruction, and the other items on the definitional
checklist are satisfied, the child is receiving a 'free appropriate public
education' as defined by the Act."
4 3
The Court then considered whether there was a substantive stan-
dard against which "benefit" should be measured. 4 The majority
held that the equal protection Congress intended in passing the
EAHCA was only equal access to public education,45 with the implicit
41. Specifically, they argued that:
Respondents agree that the Act defines "free appropriate public educa-
tion," but contend that the statutory definition is not "functional" and
thus "offers judges no guidance in their consideration of controversies
involving the identification, evaluation, or educational placement of the
child or the provision of a free appropriate public education.'"
Brief for Respondents at 28, Hendrick Hudson Dist. Bd. of Educ. v. Rowley, 458
U.S. 176 (1982). The United States, appearing as amicus curiae on behalf of re-
spondents, stated that "[alithough the Act includes definitions of a 'free appropri-
ate public education' and other related terms, the statutory definitions do not
adequately explain what is meant by 'appropriate."' Brief for United States as
Amicus Curiae at 13, Hendrick Hudson Dist. Bd. of Educ. v. Rowley, 458 U.S. 176,
187 (1982).
42. Hendrick Hudson Dist. Bd. of Educ. v. Rowley, 458 U.S. 176,188 (1982). See supra
note 17 and accompanying text.
43. Hendrick Hudson Dist. Bd. of Educ. v. Rowley, 458 U.S. 176, 189 (1982) (emphasis
added).
44. The Court found Congress' intent in passing the EAHCA was not to mandate a
potential-maximizing education, as lower courts had interpreted "appropriate ed-
ucation" to substantively require, but to accomplish integration, and require
states to adopt procedures for individualizing educational programs for handi-
capped children so that public education would be accessible to them. Id.
45. Id. at 192. Three important judicial precedents to the EAHCA upon which the
Court based its determination that the equal protection intended was equal access
were San Antonio Indep. School Dist. v. Rodriquez, 411 U.S. 1 (1973); Mills v.
Board of Educ., 348 F. Supp. 866 (D.D.C. 1972); and Pennsylvania Ass'n for Re-
tarded Children v. Pennsylvania, 343 F. Supp. 279 (E.D. Pa. 1972).
For a more extensive analysis of the Court's discussion of legislative and judi-
cial history of the EAHCA than is within the scope of this Article see generally
Note, Landmark, supra note 6; Note, supra note 1; and Note, Crippling, supra
note 6.
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requirement that such access be "meaningful." 46 If a handicapped
child has access to public education and receives "some educational
benefit" from it, Congress' intent has been met.47 The Court refused
to establish a line to be crossed in every case before a child can be said
to have benefited; the test is more some amount of achievement that is
subjectively sufficient in each individual case.48 The Court held that
in the particular case of a mainstreamed child being educated in the
regular classroom, such as Amy Rowley, the IEP will be considered
beneficial if it is "reasonably calculated to enable the child to achieve
passing marks and advance from grade to grade."49
2. Scope of Judicial Review of Educational Decisions
The Court also held that judicial review of state educational deci-
sions is limited to two determinations: (1) whether the child's IEP is
"reasonably calculated to enable the child to receive educational bene-
fits"; and (2) whether the state has complied with the procedures man-
dated by the EAHCA.50 If the IEP's combination of special education
and related services allows the child "some benefit," if the IEP was
developed with involvement of both educational personnel and par-
ents, and if required procedures for annual review and response to pa-
rental complaint were followed, then "the State has complied with the
obligations imposed by Congress and the courts can require no
more." 51 Since the district had implemented the required procedural
46. Hendrick Hudson Dist. Bd. of Educ. v. Rowley, 458 U.S. 176, 200 (1982).
47. Id.
48. It is clear that the benefits obtainable by children at one end of the spec-
trum will differ dramatically from those obtainable by children at the
other end, with infinite variations in between. One child may have little
difficulty competing successfully in an academic setting with nonhandi-
capped children while another child may encounter great difficulty in
acquiring even the most basic of self-maintenance skills. We do not at-
tempt today to establish any one test for determining the adequacy of
educational benefits conferred upon all children covered by the Act.
Id. at 202.
49. Id. at 204.
50. Id. at 206-07. Petitioners had contended that courts may not review the substance
of the educational program offered by the state, only whether the state followed
the proper procedural safeguards. Respondents contended that courts are to ex-
ercise de novo review over state educational decisions and policies, as well as
processes. Id. at 205.
51. Id. The Court reasoned that questions of educational policy and methodology are
traditionally reserved to the states, and that by guaranteeing parents recourse to
a civil action if dissatisfied with the results of state administrative proceedings
over their child's IEP, Congress did not intend to displace the primacy of States in
the field of education. The Court cited its previous caution in San Antonio School
Dist. v. Rodriquez, 411 U.S. 1, 42 (1973), that "courts lack the 'specialized knowl-
edge and experience' necessary to resolve 'persistent and difficult questions of
educational policy."' Hendrick Hudson Dist. Bd. of Educ. v. Rowley, 458 U.S. 176,
208 (1982). See also id. at 208 n.30.
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safeguards, since Amy's special education and related services had
been calculated to meet her educational needs, and since the Court
found factually that Amy was benefiting from her education, the
Court held that the school district had provided Amy an "adequate
education."5
2
C. Concerns of Educators and Parents After Rowley
Rowley gave parents and educators an approach with which to de-
termine if a handicapped child is receiving an appropriate education.
The Court told some of the questions to ask. Has the child been af-
forded meaningful access to the public school, or placed in the least
restrictive setting that will afford him an education that can be mean-
ingful? Has an IEP been prepared that sets forth special education
and related services calculated by school personnel to enable the child
to receive educational benefit? Is the mainstreamed child receiving
high enough marks on class work to pass from grade to grade? Was
the IEP prepared for the child at a conference of educators and par-
ents? Has the state established and followed the required procedural
safeguards?
However, answers to whether a particular child was receiving the
type of special education and all the services that child should re-
mained elusive.5 3 The Court had defined "appropriate" with other
52. Hendrick Hudson Dist. Bd. of Educ. v. Rowley, 458 U.S. 176, 209-10 (1982).
53. A commentator who presaged additional litigation following Rowley took no risk.
See, e.g., Note, Landmark, supra note 6, at 176: "Rowley has not provided final
clarification of either the substantive or procedural mandate of the EAHCA.
There will be more litigation under the Act."
Courts have had various difficulties applying the Rowley interpretations. In
Lang v. Braintree School Comm., 545 F. Supp. 1221 (D. Mass. 1982), the court
applied Rowley to determine extent of judicial review and appropriateness of the
child's IEP. The court found that review should lie somewhere between a trial de
novo and absolute deference to the state hearing officer. The court approved the
IEP since it was based on legitimate educational philosophy and would provide
educational benefit.
In Adam Cent. School Dist. v. Deist, 214 Neb. 307, 334 N.W.2d 775 (1983), rehg,
215 Neb. 284, 338 N.W.2d 591 (1983), cert. denied, 104 S. Ct. 239 (1984), the
Supreme Court of Nebraska reheard a case it had decided under the Eighth Cir-
cuit's interpretation of a free appropriate public education. See Springdale School
Dist. No. 50 v. Grace, 656 F.2d 300 (8th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 103 S. Ct. 2086
(1983). While the court substituted "sufficient support services to permit the
child to benefit educationally" for the Springdale standard of "opportunity to
achieve full potential" in its opinion in three places, the court reached exactly the
same conclusion under either standard: the school district was required to pay
for residential placement near the handicapped child's home even though the boy
had been making progress in a more distant state facility.
In dismissing Appel v. Ambach, E.H.L.R. Dec. 554:236 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 6, 1982),
a federal district court of New York interpreted Rowley as limiting courts to ex-
amining an IEP for procedural regularity if it appears to have been calculated to
benefit the child in some way. The court felt precluded from making an in-
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amorphous terms: "meaningful,"54 "some educational benefit,"5 5 and
reasonably calculated."56 The original question was simply divided
and subdivided into sets of questions. What is the amplitude of "mean-
ingful" access? Presumably this means a handicapped child cannot
simply be allowed into the public school building and then left to
flounder with instruction beyond his mental comprehension or a phys-
ical plant he is unable to maneuver. The child must be furnished with
materials and a setting through which he can receive meaning from
what is being taught. But it is apparently not necessary that he under-
stand fully or be able to participate in all or even most of the school
setting. If access is "meaningful" so long as there is "some benefit,"
how much or how little benefit will suffice?
5 7
Almost any educational program would seem to provide some ben-
dependent finding on whether the child was receiving an appropriate education
without residential placement, and remanded the case to the state educational
agency. In Frank v. Grover, E.H.L.R. Dec. 554:148 (Wis. Cir. Ct., Dane County,
Branch 11 July 30, 1982), the Judge admitted personal agreement with a parental
request for services, but felt compelled to dismiss the claim since the school dis-
trict had shown by a preponderance of the evidence that it had complied with the
procedures of the EAHCA and had reasonably calculated the IEP to provide edu-
cational benefit.
Some states have held Rowley is not controlling when the state constitution or
a state statute mandates a higher substantive standard. See Harrell v. Wilson
County Schools, 58 N.C. App. 260, 293 S.E.2d 687 (1982) (Rowley does not control
state courts' interpretation of a separate state statute which requires that each
handicapped child be provided an opportunity to achieve full potential commen-
surate with that given other children), cert denied, 460 U.S. 1012 (1983); In re
Traverse Bay Area Inter. School Dist., Mich. State Educ. Agency Case No. 82-
0143, E.H.L.R. Dec. 504:140 (Aug. 9,1982) (Michigan law mandates more stringent
standard than Rowley decision and handicapped child's educational program in
Michigan should allow child to develop to maximum potential).
A bill requiring the state's public schools to provide handicapped children
with equal educational opportunity, rather than simply some benefit, was intro-
duced during the 1985 session of the Nebraska Legislature. L.B. 254, 89th Leg.,
1st Sess., 1985. However, the bill was killed by the Education Committee.
For a list of states that have such statutes and citations to those statutes, see
Note, Landmark, supra note 6, at 174-75 n.129-30 and accompanying text.
54. Hendrick Hudson Dist. Bd. of Educ. v. Rowley, 458 U.S. 176,200 (1982). See supra
note 39 and accompanying text.
55. Hendrick Hudson Dist. Bd. of Educ. v. Rowley, 458 U.S. 176, 200 (1982).
56. Id. at 204. See supra note 42 and accompanying text.
57. Justice White voiced some of these questions in his dissent:
While "meaningful" is no more enlightening than "appropriate," the
Court purports to clarify itself. Because Amy was provided with some
specialized instruction from which she obtained some benefit and be-
cause she passed from grade to grade, she was receiving a meaningful
and therefore appropriate education.... It would apparently satisfy
the Court's standard of "access to specialized instruction and related
services which are individually designed to provide educational benefit
to the handicapped child," ante at 201, for a deaf child such as Amy to be
given a teacher with a loud voice, for she would benefit from that
service.
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efit. Will educational authorities' opinion that an IEP provides "some
benefit" always defeat a parent's view that the child is not benefiting
enough, so long as the school implemented the procedural require-
ments? Passing from grade to grade is "one important factor"5 8 when
determining whether a child is receiving some benefit. Must parents
then wait until it is clear that their child will fail to pass before they
can prove the IEP's inappropriateness? If a child is not mainstreamed,
what criteria will tell that the child is receiving sufficient benefit?
Are parents unable to have a single addition or deletion made to
the IEP if the program as a whole is found to be reasonably calculated
to benefit the child?s9 How large is the margin for error the Court
seems to be allowing educators through the words "reasonably calcu-
lated" to enable the child to receive educational benefits? How inde-
pendently can courts decide reasonableness of a school district's plan
based upon a preponderance of the evidence, within the two-point re-
view delimited by Rowley?60
The Court's decision also left the impression that it would continue
to follow its previous rulings emphasizing state and local control of
educational decisions 6l and its restrictive interpretation of legislation
granting rights to handicapped persons.62 The decision seemed to en-
Hendrick Hudson Dist. Bd. of of Educ. v. Rowley, 458 U.S. 176, 214 (1982) (White,
J., dissenting) (footnote omitted) (emphasis in original).
58. Id. at 207 n. 28.
59. In his dissent, Justice White argued "[the Court's standard... would not permit
a challenge to part of the IEP; the legislative history demonstrates... that Con-
gress intended such challenges to be possible, even if the plan as developed is
reasonably calculated to give the child some benefits." Id. at 218 (White, J.,
dissenting).
60. Id. at 204.
61. The Court cited San Antonio Indep. School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1 (1973)
(education is not a fundamental right evoking strict judicial scrutiny of state edu-
cational decisions; courts lack the specialized knowledge to resolve questions of
educational policy that therefore must be left to the state and local educational
agencies), and Epperson v. Arkansas, 393 U.S. 97 (1968) ("public education in our
Nation is committed to the control of state and local authorities"). See also Plyler
v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202 (1982) (state educational decisions can only be judged with
the rational basis test of constitutionality since education is not a fundamental
right).
62. The Court has considered handicapped persons' rights four times since 1979:
Youngberg v. Romeo, 457 U.S. 307 (1982) (mentally retarded individual was enti-
tled to training sufficient to allow freedom from unnecessary restraint; decision
should not be construed as recognizing a constitutional right to training- courts
must respect judgments by professionals in individual cases); Mills v. Rogers, 457
U.S. 291 (1982) (federal Constitution imposes only "minimal" rights, handicapped
petitioner should first look under state constitution for more extensive substan-
tive rights); Pennhurst State School v. Halderman, 451 U.S. 1 (1981) (Develop-
mentally Disabled Assistance and Bill of Rights Act of 1975 could not impose
affirmative obligations since Congress cannot create federal substantive rights
unless it does so "unambiguously"); Southeastern Community College v. Davis,
442 U.S. 397 (1979) (§ 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 does not require af-
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courage local school boards to resist parental demands for changes in
the school's prescribed program.63 Advocates of handicapped children
were left with the apprehension that the only time they might win a
claim would be if educational authorities had flaunted EAHCA proce-
dural safeguards.64
III. THE TATRO DECISION
A. Administrative and Lower Court Action
The persistent questions remaining after Rowley led the Supreme
Court to grant certiorari to consider what "related services" schools
must provide to enable handicapped children to benefit from their
guaranteed free appropriate public education.65 The narrow issue in
Tatro was whether Irving School District was required to provide
Clean Intermittent Catheterization (CIC)66 for an eight-year-old girl
as a related service of her individualized educational program.
firmative action on behalf of handicapped persons, but only absence of discrimia-
tion and does not require a professional school to eliminate all physical
qualifications for admission; applicant can be refused admission on basis that
deafness would impair ability to function as a nurse). See also Note, Landmark,
supra note 6, at 166.
63. Note, Landmark, supra note 6, at 168.
64. Id.
65. Irving Indep. School Dist. v. Tatro, 104 S. Ct. 3371 (1984). The Court disposed of
the second issue brought before the Court, the availability of attorneys' fees
under § 504 in an action to secure educational services for the handicapped, by
citing its decision in Smith. Id. at 3379. Therefore, analysis of the Tatro decision
can focus solely on what it added to the interpretation of the above provisions of
the EAHCA. See generally Note, A Confusion of Rights and Remedies: Tatro v.
Texas, 14 CONN. L. REv. 585 (1982).
66. CIC was described variously in the lower court opinions and the briefs for either
side as being anything from a simple procedure perfomable in a few minutes, to a
medical procedure requiring medical supervision of twenty-two detailed steps.
See Tatro v. Texas, 516 F. Supp. 968, 970 n.1 (1981). The definition finally ac-
cepted by the Supreme Court was "a procedure involving the insertion of a cathe-
ter into the urethra to drain the bladder.... The procedure is a simple one that
may be performed in a few minutes by a layperson with less than an hour's train-
ing." Irving Indep. School Dist. v. Tatro, 104 S. Ct. 3371, 3374 (1984). Amber's
parents, teenaged brother, and babysitter provided her with CIC at home.
See supra note 30 for cases evidencing the confusion in the lower courts and
administrative bodies in defining "related services." The EAHCA definition of
"related services" is illustrated by a list of such services, but these are not meant
to be exclusive. 20 U.S.C. § 1401(17) (1982). The Department of Education's in-
terpretive regulation adds that "the items named are not all of the possible items
that are covered, whether like or unlike the ones named." 34 C.F.R. § 300.6
(1982). See also Note, supra note 65, at 592 nn. 37-43 and accompanying text. See
generally Mooney & Aronson, Solomon Revisited: Separating Education and
Other than Educational Needs in Special Educational Residential Placements, 14
CONN. L. REv. 531 (1982); Stark, Tragic Choices in Special Education: The Effect




Amber Tatro was born with spina bifida, which caused orthopedic
and speech impairments, and a bladder condition that prevents her
from voiding voluntarily.67 To prevent injury to her kidneys, she re-
quires catheterization every three to four hours.
When Amber was three years old her parents met with school per-
sonnel to prepare an IEP that would have placed Amber in early
childhood development classes in the public school. The IEP also pro-
vided special services such as physical and occupational therapy. The
school district refused, however, to provide CIC, maintaining that CIC
was medical treatment since it required a prescription by a physician,
training that the school's nurse did not have, and instruments the
school did not have ready access to. The Tatros argued that, under
EAHCA, CIC was a related service necessary for Amber to benefit
from her special education, and requested a hearing. The hearing of-
ficer found that the school was required to provide CIC services, as did
the Texas State Commissioner of Education upon the school board's
appeal.68 The school district appealed to the State Board of Education,
which reversed the Commissioner's finding.69
The Tatros filed a civil suit in federal court, requesting a
mandatory injunction.70 The district court issued a memorandum
67. Spina bifada is the more common name for myelodysplasia, or "open spine."
68. Brief for Respondents at 5, Irving Indep. School Dist. v. Tatro, 104 S. Ct. 3371
(1984) (citing Amber T. and Mary T. v. Irving Indep. School Dist., Texas Educ.
Agency Docket No. 115-SE-579 (Aug. 6, 1979)).
69. Texas has established a two-tiered review system, as have many other states, to
comply with the EAHCA's procedural safeguard requirements:
Whenever a complaint has been received .. . the parents or guardian
shall have an opportunity for an impartial due process hearing which
shall be conducted by the State educational agency or by the local educa-
tional agency or intermediate educational unit, as determined by State
law or by the State educational agency.
20 U.S.C. § 1415(b)(2) (1982). The statute provides further that:
If the hearing required in paragraph (2) of subsection (b) of this section
is conducted by a local educational agency or an intermediate educa-
tional unit, any party aggrieved by the findings and decision rendered in
such a hearing may appeal to the State educational agency which shall
conduct an impartial review of such hearing.
20 U.S.C. § 1415(c) (1982). See TEx. EDUC. CODE ANN. § 16.104 (Vernon 1979).
70. Tatro v. Texas, 481 F. Supp. 1224 (N.D. Tex. 1979). The statute provides that:
Any party aggrieved by the findings and decision made under subsection
(b) of this section who does not have the right to appeal under subsection
(c) of this section, and any party aggrieved by the findings and decision
under subsection (c) of this section, shall have the right to bring a civil
action with respect to the complaint presented pursuant to this section,
which action may be brought in any State court of competent jurisdiction
or in a district court of the United States without regard to the amount
in controversy. In any action brought under this paragraph the court
shall receive the records of the administrative proceedings, shall hear
additional evidence at the request of a party, and, basing its decision on
the preponderance of the evidence, shall grant such relief as the court
determines is appropriate.
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opinion denying the injunction. In the opinion Judge Higginbotham
stated that if CIC were deemed a medical service, the school could not
be required to perform it, since only medical services for diagnosis of
the handicapping condition must be provided under the EAHCA.71
While CIC might fit within the "school health services"72 included in
the definition of "related services" in United States Department of Ed-
ucation regulations, the judge ruled that mere agency regulations can-
not create additional duty. The opinion concluded that "school health
services," performed by a nurse or other qualified person in the
school,73 are no more than the related services delineated in the
EAHCA.74
Judge Higgenbotham then ruled that because Amber needed CIC
whether or not she was in school, the need for the service did not arise
from the effort to educate. CIC, therefore, was not related to Amber's
special education. The judge reasoned that there is a difference be-
tween such maintenance of life systems and enhancing a handicapped
person's ability to learn.75
On appeal, the Fifth Circuit (Tatro 1) vacated Judge Higginbot-
ham's memorandum opinion and supplied its own interpretation of
when a needed service fits the EAHCA definition. The court held that
20 U.S.C. § 1415(e)(2) (1982). The Tatros' initial suit also requested damages and
attorneys' fees. See supra notes 65 and 71.
71. The medical services required are illustrated by a variety of specific services, but
all carefully limited by Congress to diagnostic and evaluation purposes. Judge
Higgenbotham held that this explicit qualification prohibits "finding a congres-
sional intent to furnish all support services needed by persons during school not
because of the schooling but because that care is always required." Tatro v.
Texas, 481 F. Supp. 1224, 1227 (N.D. Tex. 1979).
72. The Secretary of Education is empowered to issue such regulations as may be
necessary to carry out the provisions of the EAHCA. 20 U.S.C. § 1417(b) (1982).
The regulations, 34 C.F.R. § 300.13(a) (1984), define "related services" as
transportation and such developmental, corrective, and other supportive services
as are required to assist a handicapped child to benefit from special education,
and includes speech pathology and audiology, psychological services, physical and
occupational therapy, recreation, early identification and assessment of disabili-
ties in children, counseling services, and medical services for diagnostic or evalua-
tion purposes. The term also includes school health services, social work services
in schools, and parent counseling and training.
73. "School health services" are defined as "services provided by a qualified nurse or
other qualified person." 34 C.F.R. § 300.13(a)(10) (1984). "Medical services" are
defined by the Department's implementation regulations as "services provided by
a licensed physician to determine a child's medically related handicapping condi-
tion which results in the child's need for special education and related services."
Id. at § 300.13(a)(4).
74. Tatro v. Texas, 481 F. Supp. 1224, 1228 (N.D. Tex. 1979).
75. The court held that the plaintiffs could not convert a statute (Rehabilitation Act
§ 504) prohibiting discrimination in certain governmental programs into a statute
requiring the setting up of governmental health care for people seeking to partici-
pate in such programs.
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if Amber could be present in a classroom only with CIC, then CIC is a
related supportive service necessary for her to "benefit from the spe-
cial education to which she is entitled ... "76 The court remanded
the case to be tried under this new definition.
Judge Higginbotham applied the Fifth Circuit's new rule to the
facts of the case. Since the Fifth Circuit determined that CIC was a
supportive service necessary for Amber to benefit from her individual-
ized educational plan, then the school would have to supply CIC un-
less it were a medical service. The court found that under Texas law a
physician does not have to be present during CIC so long as the physi-
cian in charge of the case so prescribes. 77 Therefore, under the De-
partment of Education definitions, CIC is not a medical service,78 but
is a school health service that could be required of the school as part of
Amber's IEP.79 The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals (Tatro II)
affirmed.o
B. The Supreme Court Opinion
The Supreme Court combined the questions asked by the two
courts below, creating a two-part approach to "related services" ac-
tions. The Court first considered whether CIC was required to assist a
handicapped child to benefit from special education. The Court then
asked whether CIC was excluded from required related services be-
cause it was a medical service for a purpose other than diagnosis or
evaluation.
In a short, unanimous opinion,8s the Court affirmed the Fifth Cir-
cuit's opinion that, without CIC services during the school day, Amber
could not attend school and could not benefit from special education at
all. The Court restated its ruling in Rowley that "'Congress sought
primarily to make public education available to handicapped children'
and 'to make such access meaningful.' "82 The Court continued:
A service that enables a handicapped child to remain at school during the day
is an important means of providing the child with the meaningful access to
education that Congress envisioned. The Act makes specific provision for
services, like transportation, for example, that do no more than enable a child
to be physically present in class... and the Act specifically authorizes grants
76. Tatro v. Texas, 625 F.2d 557, 562 (5th Cir. 1980).
77. See TEx. REv. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 4495-4512 (Vernon 1976). See infra note 123
and accompanying text.
78. See supra note 73.
79. Tatro v. Texas, 516 F. Supp. 968, 977 (1981).
80. Tatro v. Texas, 703 F.2d 823 (5th Cir. 1983).
81. Justices Stevens and Brennan each wrote a short opinion concurring with the
majority on the "related services" issue, but dissenting on the issue of attorneys'
fees. Justice Marshall joined with Justice Brennan. Irving Indep. School Dist. v.
Tatro, 104 S. Ct. 3371, 3379-80 (1984) (Brennan, J., dissenting).




for schools to alter buildings and equipment to make them accessible to the
handicapped... Services like CIC that permit a child to remain at school
during the day are no less related to the effort to educate than are services
that enable the child to reach, enter, or exit the school.
8 3
The Court held, therefore, that CIC is a "'supportive servic[e] ...
required to assist a handicapped child to benefit from special
education.' "84
The Court drew its circle around the "related services" that schools
must provide with CIC inside. The school district had argued that any
service requiring a physician's prescription and ultimate superinten-
dence is a "medical service."85 The Court pointed out that, under the
lower court's interpretation of Texas state law, CIC may legally be
administered by a nurse or trained layperson. The Court saw no dis-
tinction between a school nurse's providing CIC for a handicapped
child, and the routine practice of dispensing prescription medications
to nonhandicapped children.86 The Court instead accepted the De-
partment of Education's distinction between "medical services" and
"school health services" that are to be provided when they are related
to a child's receiving educational benefit: "the Secretary has deter-
mined that the services of a school nurse otherwise qualifying as a
'related service' are not subject to exclusion as a 'medical service," but
the services of a physician are excludable as such."87
The Court interpreted the intent of the Secretary of Education and
of Congress based on dollars and cents.88 The Court reasoned that
school nurses are already a part of school systems and would not be
the sort of financial burden that Congress was concerned with when it
83. Id.
84. Id.
85. Id. at 3378. See infra note 86.
86. The Court found that: '"The regulations define 'related services' for handicapped
children to include 'school health services,' . . . which are defined in turn as
'services provided by a qualified school nurse or other qualified person .....
'Medical services' are defined as 'services provided by a licensed physician."' Ir-
ving Indep. School Dist. v. Tatro, 104 S. Ct. 3371, 3378 (1984). The Court noted
that the regulations define only those "medical services" that are actually owed
to handicapped children, which are services provided by a physician "to deter-
mine a child's medically related handicapping condition which results in the
child's need for special education and related services." Id. at 3378 n.10.
87. Id. at 3378. The Court's decision was also influenced by a Department of Educa-
tion ruling that had found CIC to be a "related service." See 46 Fed. Reg. 4912
(1981). While the Department had indefinitely postponed the date on which this
ruling would take effect, it had been consistently accepting CIC as an allowable
expense on schools' applications for funds under Part B of the EAHCA. See Ir-
ving Indep. School Dist. v. Tatro, 104 S. Ct. 3371, 3377 n.7 (1984).
88. "Although Congress devoted little discussion to the 'medical services' exclusion,
the Secretary could reasonably have concluded that it was designed to spare
schools from an obligation to provide a service that might well prove unduly ex-
pensive and beyond the range of their competence." Irving Indep. School Dist. v.
Tatro, 104 S. Ct. 3371, 3378 (1984).
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excluded medical services.8 9 Additional financial burden, of course,
was a primary concern of the states and school districts watching the
case.9 0 With these concerns in mind, the Court attempted to narrow
its ruling, emphasizing that only school health services that otherwise
qualify as related services must be provided. In other words, entitle-
ment to any "related service" is prefaced on a child's being handi-
capped, requiring special education, and needing the service in order
to benefit from his special education. The Court thus excluded any
services that could be performed outside of the school day, no matter
how easily a school nurse or layperson could provide them.91 The
Court pointed out that respondents were not asking the school to pro-
vide medical instruments or equipment for Amber's CIC, only services
of a qualified person.
92
IV. THE TATRO DECISION'S CONTRIBUTION TO EAHCA
INTERPRETATION AND APPLICATION
A. Questions Answered by Tatro
Education officials and advocates of handicapped persons had
awaited the Supreme Court's decision of the Tatro case with equal in-
terest. Both groups not only wanted a functional distinction between
required related services and medical services, but also hoped that the
Court had recognized the obscureness of its definitions in Rowley and
would clarify them.93 The Court did draw a clear line between re-
quired school health services and medical services. The Court also ex-
pressly affirmed its restrictive stance toward interpretation of
legislation granting rights to the handicapped. And the Court did an-
swer directly the question created by its decision in Rowley regarding
judicial review of state educational decisions.
89. Id. The Court did not address the figures introduced by the National School
Boards Association stating that while approximately 86,000 facilities are being
used in the United States to educate public school students, only about 30,000
school nurses are employed by public school systems. Brief of Amicus Curiae,
Nat'l School Bds. Ass'n, Irving Indep. School Dist. v. Tatro, 104 S. Ct. 3371 (1984).
90. See Brief for Petitioners, Irving Indep. School Dist. v. Tatro, 104 S. Ct. 3371 (1984)
[hereinafter cited as Brief for Petitioners]; Brief of Amicus Curiae, Nat'l School
Bds. Ass'n, Irving Indep. School Dist. v. Tatro, 104 S. Ct. 3371 (1984) [hereinafter
cited as Nat'l School Bds. Brief].
91. The Court stated: "For example, if a particular medication or treatment may
appropriately be administered to a handicapped child other than during the
school day, a school is not required to provide nursing services to administer it."
Irving Indep. School Dist. v. Tatro, 104 S. Ct. 3371, 3379 (1984). See infra note 104
and accompanying text.
92. Irving Indep. School Dist. v. Tatro, 104 S. Ct. 3371, 3379. See infra text accompa-
nying note 97.
93. Statement of Gwendolyn Gregory, Deputy Legal Counsel for National School
Bds. Ass'n, at Nebraska Council of School Attorneys School Law Seminar, Uni-
versity of Nebraska College of Law (June 15, 1984) [hereinafter cited as Gregory].
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First, the Court made a bright distinction between medical services
and related services. The two-question approach modeled by the
Court can be applied by lower courts and state administrative agencies
when services related to special education are difficult to separate
from medical services. If a service is not necessary for the child to
benefit from public education, or is a medical service by a physician
for purposes other than diagnosis or evaluation of the handicapping
condition, then a school need not provide it.
4
The Court's holding dissolved the spectres being conjured by
school officials that a decision in favor of Amber would be the begin-
ning of national health care through the schools.95 Schools are re-
quired to provide "related services" only when a child is handicapped
so as to require special education, only when the services are needed
for the child to benefit from his special educational program, and only
when they can be delegated by a prescribing physician to a nurse or
other qualified person.96 Any services that can be provided outside of
school hours will not be provided at school. The Court's note "that
respondents are not asking petitioner to provide equipment that Am-
ber needs for CIC"97 seems to be a statement that schools are also not
responsible for the medical instruments or equipment required, even
when the service is found to be related to the child's education. There-
fore, to the extent that any true medical services are required in order
for the child to receive the school health services, e.g., the medical
prescription, equipment, and ongoing monitoring, such services are ob-
tainable outside the school setting and will be the responsibility of the
child's guardians.98
94. See Irving Indep. School Dist. v. Tatro, 104 S. Ct. 3371, 3379 (1984).
95. One commentator has observed. "The 5th Circuit approach in Tatro 'was so
broad that anything the kid needed during the school day had to be provided,'
including provision of equipment such as wheelchairs and eyeglasses."
Gwendolyn Gregory to School Law News at 3, July 13, 1984. See infra note 104.
But see supra note 95.
96. The Court stated. "In the absence of a handicap that requires special education,
the need for what otherwise might qualify as a related service does not create an
obligation under the Act." Irving Indep. School Dist. v. Tatro, 104 S. Ct. 3371,
3379 (1984). See infra note 129 and accompanying text.
97. Irving Indep. School Dist. v. Tatro, 104 S. Ct. 3371, 3379 (1984).
98. Kidney dialysis had been the school district's spectre of things to come should the
Court require schools to perform CIC. Brief for Petitioner, supra note 90, at 37.
Similar fears were expressed by others:
Under the lower court decision, schools would be obligated to provide
insulin injections, kidney dialysis, and maintain tracheostomies. Colos-
tomy, ileostomy, and uretherostomy care may be needed by students.
Students may also require naso-gastric tube feedings, treatment for pres-
sure sores, or use of a respirator during the course of the day.
Nat'l School Bds. Brief, supra note 90, at 33. The Court did not expressly address
any services other than CIC. Kidney dialysis in most cases could be accomplished
other than during the school day. Brief of Amicus Curiae New York State
Comm'n on the Quality of Care for the Mentally Disabled at 3, Irving Indep.
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Second, the Court affirmed directly its general restrictive stance
toward interpretation of legislation granting rights to handicapped
children. The Court restated its view that equal access had been the
goal of Congress in adopting the EAHCA.99 The Court compared the
school health services that must be provided to transportation and
barrier removal "that do no more than enable a child to be physically
present in class ..... 100 In Rowley the Court had held that the pub-
lic school door must merely be opened to give handicapped children
access to appropriate public education. The services and personnel re-
quired by Tatro need only be sufficient to prop that door open
throughout the school day.
Finally, in a footnote to the case, the Court answered the question
regarding the extent of judicial review of state educational decisions
after Rowley.1o' The Irving School District read Rowley as limiting
judicial inquiry to whether a school district had created an IEP accord-
ing to state policy, and followed the Act's procedural requirements.102
The school district contended that substantive educational judgments
are out of the realm of the courts under Rowley and San Antonio
School Dist. v. Rodriquez.10 3 The Court cited a footnote in Rowley as
containing the accurate statement of the Court's rule:
[We held in Board of Education of Hendrick Hudson Central School District
v. Rowley ... that a court is required "not only to satisfy itself that the State
has adopted the state plan, policies, and assurances required by the Act, but
also to determine that the State has created an [individualized education plan]
for the child in question which conforms with the requirements of § 1401(19)
[defining such plans]." Judicial review is equally appropriate in this case,
which presents the legal question of a school's substantive obligation under
the "related services" requirement of § 1401(17).104
The fact that the Tatros were able to win a challenge of a singular
provision of their daughter's IEP illustrates the Court's answer to
commentators' concerns.105 Though school officials have followed
procedural requirements, and claim that the child's IEP as a whole is
reasonably calculated to benefit the child, a singular deficiency can be
attacked and changed through a civil action.
School Dist. v. Tatro, 104 S. Ct. 3371 (1984). But the other services listed by the
National School Boards Association arguably could be required to allow a child to
remain in school for the entire school day. All are services for which state law
generally does not require physician performance. See AM. NURSES ASS'N,
SCHOOL NURSES WORKING WITH HANDICAPPED CHILDREN 3 (1980).
99. See supra note 82 and accompanying text.
100. Irving Indep. School Dist. v. Tatro, 104 S. Ct. 3371, 3377 (1984).
101. Id. at 3376.
102. Id. See Brief for Petitioners, supra note 90, at 33.
103. See supra notes 45 and 61 and accompanying text.
104. Irving Indep. School Dist. v. Tatro, 104 S. Ct. 3371, 3376 n.6 (1984) (citation
omitted).
105. See supra notes 6, 53, 59-61 and accompanying text.
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B. Questions Tatro Did Not Answer and New Grey Areas
1. "Meaningful Access" and "Some Benefit"
Disappointingly, the Court did not shed any real light on the
phrases "meaningful access" and "some benefit." The Court's rule in
Rowley was that if a handicapped child is given access to public educa-
tion and receives some educational benefit, then Congress' intent has
been accomplished.106 Under that standard, it seems the Court could
have decided that the half day Amber might attend school without
CIC provided the intended access and some educational benefit. The
Court did not explain whether it was raising its standard or how it
determined that the educational benefit of a half day's access would
not be sufficient. The rule that the door not only must be opened to
handicapped children, but now must remain open throughout the nor-
mal school day may indicate that the Rowley standard is not as mini-
mal as commentators believed.107 Or, the Court may have been
silently applying its rule in Rowley that the IEP of a mainstreamed
child is adequate only if it is calculated to enable the child to achieve
passing marks and advance from grade to grade.108 Attending school
half days would probably not have allowed Amber to pass to the next
grade within one year. If the Court was applying that rule, or in-
tending to broaden the standard of "some benefit," it would have been
helpful for the Court to have explained its action. Instead, the Court
merely stated that CIC is one provision Congress would have intended
as a way to provide meaningful access.
2. The Court's Conflicting Attitudes Toward Schools' Financial
Burdens
There will be new problems in applying the Court's directives in
Tatro. One area of confusion will be the Court's use of expense as a
standard in interpreting Congress' intent in the EAHCA. The Court
emphasized financial burden several times in determining what serv-
ices Congress would have intended to require schools to provide and
what services were excluded.109 The Court first stated that it was rea-
sonable to construe that Congress intended to exclude services of a
physician or a hospital, but not school nursing services, because of the
expense of the former compared to the latter.11o The Court also noted
that the school was not being asked to bear the expense of medical
106. See supra notes 43-49 and accompanying text.
107. See supra notes 6, 53, 56-57 and accompanying text.
108. See supra note 49 and accompanying text.
109. Irving Indep. School Dist. v. Tatro, 104 S. Ct. 3371, 3378 (1984).
110. "[Ihe Secretary could... reasonably conclude that school nursing services are
not the sort of burden that Congress intended to exclude .... " Id.
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equipment the child needed for the related service. 1 1 The footnote
concluding the Court's analysis of whether CIC is a related service
indicates a factor in the Court's decision was that "it would be far
more costly to pay for Amber's instruction and CIC services at a pri-
vate school, or to arrange for home tutoring, than to provide CIC at
the regular public school placement provided."112 Finally, the Court
protected schools from having to pay attorneys' fees.1'3
But contravening any use of "expense" as a guideline is the Court's
note that expense will not keep schools from having to provide in-
struction in hospitals and at home to children with serious medical
needs.114 In addition, the Court found that Congress intended that
schools hire "specially trained personnel to help handicapped chil-
dren, such as 'trained occupational therapists, speech therapists, psy-
chologists, social workers and other appropriately trained
personnel.' "115
The Court based the reasonableness of its construction of Congres-
sional intent to provide school nursing services on the fact that
"[s]chool nurses have long been a part of the educational system
.... "116 The Court ignored, however, the paucity of school nurses in
many school systems."i 7 For many school districts now sharing one
nurse between buildings there may be a very real expense involved in
hiring additional school nurses to meet needs of particular handi-
capped students. The Court's limitation of required related services to
those that could be provided by a school nurse or "layperson," to de-
fray the cost of additional employees,"n8 was also not fiscally realistic
in light of grievances over such assignments filed by teachers' unions.
When school employees' contracts defeat support service assignments,
the recourse will be for the school to hire additonal individuals just to
perform related services, according to the Ninth Circuit Court of
Appeals.119
111. "[We note that respondents are not asking petitioner to provide equipment that
Amber needs for CIC." Id. at 3379 (emphasis added).
112. Id. at 3379 n.13.
113. Id. at 3379 (citing Smith v. Robinson, 104 S. Ct. 3457 (1984)).
114. Id. at 3378 n.11.
115. Id. at 3378 (citation omitted).
116. Id.
117. See White, Are You Ready to Provide the Health Services Demanded of the
Schools?, AM. SCHOOL BD. 25, 26 (June 1981).
118. Irving Indep. School Dist. v. Tatro, 104 S. Ct. 3771, 3379 (1984).
119. In Department of Educ., State of Hawaii v. Katherine D., 531 F. Supp. 517,520 (D.
Hawaii 1982), amended, 727 F.2d 809 (9th Cir. 1984), the Hawaii Department of
Education offered public school placement and training of all school personnel
expected to be in the vicinity of a child with cystic fybrosis. As well as medication
and suctioning of mucus, school personnel had to be trained to respond to acci-
dental dislodgement of the child's tracheotomy tube. After the first training ses-
sion, three unions representing teachers and principals filed grievances charging
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The Court also discounted the costs of additional liability insurance
or of judgments when schools and teachers are not exempted from
liability by state law or covered by school or union policies for services
performed outside their contracts.1 2 0 Irving School District had at-
tempted to distinguish a school nurse's administering prescription
drugs from administering CIC because Texas state law limits the lia-
bility of school personnel administering prescription drugs, but does
not for unspecifically defined school health services.12 1 The Court
found that:
[P]ossibility of liability bears no relation to whether CIC is a 'related service.'
... Congress assumed that states receiving the generous grants under the Act
"violation of their contracts of employment by being required to perform duties
of a medical nature outside the scope of their contractual duties." Id. at 520. The
employees expressed "fears that they could not perform the medical procedure
correctly... fear of the personal aspects of the procedure... and fear of being
sued if something untoward occurred during the procedure." Id. The grievances
were not settled at the time of either the district court or court of appeals deci-
sions.
The federal district court had held that the IEP was inadequate since no
school personnel would administer the necessary health services. Id. at 528. The
Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed this part of the case, holding that
the school board could arrange for special personnel to provide the services if the
union prevailed in the contract dispute. A plan proposing a homebound program
could not solve the personnel problem as it would not satisfy the concept of the
"least restrictive environment" prescribed by the federal regulations. By requir-
ing the school to provide the services even if it meant hiring special personnel,
the court also ruled implicitly that tracheotomy maintenance is a "related serv-
ices," not a "medical service."
In Wisconsin, the parents of a child susceptible to allergic reaction if stung by
a bee asked the school to store allergy medication and to provide someone to
administer an injection if necessary. Because the child's school had no health
aide or nurse, a teacher was asked to perform the service. The teacher refused,
and the teacher union filed a grievance, claiming that to train the -teacher would
exclude him from protection from liability under state medical practices statutes.
An administrator finally volunteered to perform the service. In a similar case in
Montgomery County, Maryland, both teacher and principal refused because of
lack of coverage under their N.E.A. liability insurance. See infma note 121 and
accompanying text. The school system finally hired a teacher aide who was will-
ing to administer the shot. See White, supra note 117, at 26.
120. Irving Indep. School Dist. v. Tatro, 104 S. Ct. 3371, 3378 (1984).
121. Id. at n.12. Teacher union liability insurance policies limit the health procedures
teachers may perform. Insurance carried by the National Education Association
excludes teachers from coverage if they administer medication in a nonemer-
gency situation. White, supra note 117, at 27. Liability insurance through the
American Federation of Teachers covers teachers "only for those tasks they are
authorized [in writing] to do." Id. The A.F.T. advises teachers to refuse to per-
form noninstructional tasks. If teachers agree to dispense medication or render
other health services, the union advises them to make sure that what they are
doing is permitted by state law and is spelled out as part of their jobs in school
system policy. As more sophisticated health care is added to the list of services
schools are expected to provide, school boards will need to review their liability
coverage. See also supra note 119.
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were up to the job of managing these new risks. Whether petitioner decides to
purchase more liability insurance or to persuade the state to extend the limi-
tation on liability, the risks posed by CIC should not prove to be a large
burden.
12 2
On the whole, the Court's "financial burden" analysis is too contra-
dictory to be used by schools, administrative agencies, or lower courts
as a test of whether Congress would have intended a service or not. It
is unknown to what extent a school might use expense to draw the
line between what it will provide a handicapped child and what it will
not provide.
3. Reliance on State Medical Practices Statutes
Another prospective problem area is that state regulations may dif-
fer regarding what care nurses and laypersons can provide and what
services may be provided only by a licensed physician. The federal
district court recognized this difficulty in Tatro:
Congress, by defining the Act's reach by definitions locatable only in the law
of the respective States, perforce intended, at least to this extent, that its con-
struction be parochial. A contrary view would require a finding that Congress
intended to alter patient-doctor relations in the several States.... The
types of medical treatment that can be performed by nonphysicians, and the
extent to which any treatment must be under the control and supervision of a
licensed physician, are regulated by State law. And the courts must look to
State law to determine whether a service is a medical service. To the extent of
the accommodation of varying practices, the Act tolerates non-uniform appli-
cation. A given service, therefore, may be a related service in one State and an
exempt medical service in another.
1 2 3
122. Irving Indep. School Dist. v. Tatro, 104 S. Ct. 3371, 3378 n.12 (1984).
123. Tatro v. State of Tex., 516 F. Supp. 968, 975 (1981). The school district had con-
tended that school employees furnishing CIC would be guilty of unlawful prac-
tice of medicine under the Texas Medical Practice Act, TEX. REV. CIv. STAT.
ANN., arts. 4495, 4510, 4510a & 4510b (Vernon 1976). But Texas law allows a phy-
sician to prescribe that treatment be performed by another individual believed
competent to provide the service. Such treatment by a delegate does not consti-
tute the unlawful practice of medicine. This construction is confirmed in the
Texas Nursing Practice Act, TEx. REv. Civ. STAT. ANN. arts. 4513 (Vernon 1976).
As the district court noted. "[P]rofessional nurses may administer medications
and treatments on a physician's prescription... without any statutory require-
ment of direct supervision by the physician." Tatro v. State of Tex., 516 F. Supp.
968, 976 (1981) (quoting Op. Tex. Att'y Gen. No. H-1295 (Dec. 28, 1978)). The
Supreme Court accepted this interpretation of state law.
Whether a particular service can be delegated by a physician will be a question
of state law interpretation. Whether a delegate is indeed competent will be a
question of fact. Under most general medical practice statutes, nurses and other
qualified persons can lawfully perform medical functions delegated to them by
physicians. If there is no statute directing otherwise for a particular illness or
physical infirmity, then once a physician has determined that CIC or any other
treatment is appropriate for a patient, the physician may delegate performance of
the treatment. See Brief for Amicus Curiae Texas Medical Ass'n and Dallas
County Medical Soc'y, Tatro v. State of Tex., 516 F. Supp. 968, 989 (1981).
An interesting restriction on the New Jersey Medical Practices statute is a
SCHOOL HEALTH SERVICES
Thus handicapped individuals may receive more or less services de-
pending on the state in which they reside.
Though CIC has now been expressly placed in the category of "re-
lated services" by the Supreme Court, other procedures are still open
to question, e.g., insulin injections, tracheostomy maintenance, colos-
tomy, ileostomy, uretherostomy care, naso-gastric tube feedings, treat-
ment for pressure sores, and use of a respirator.124 State educational
agencies may respond to budgetary confines by pressuring state legis-
lators or state agencies to legislate away as many "school health serv-
ices" as possible by disallowing their delegation to nonphysicians. To
assure a minimum, Congress may need to amend the EAHCA to spec-
ify some of the procedures that are definitely to be included within the
category of "related services."
Under most medical practice statutes, nurses and other qualified
persons can lawfully perform medical functions delegated to them by
physicians. Usually, unless a specific statute directs otherwise, a phy-
sician may delegate performance of part or all of a treatment to an
individual believed capable of competently providing the prescribed
service.12s The next question, however, will be whether the physician
is "delegating to a competent person" when the physician gives the
prescription to the parent, who gives instructions and permission to
the principal, who delegates authority to someone in the school to give
out the medication, as would be the usual course of events. To keep
from running afoul of medical practice statutes in most states, schools
will have to tighten procedures to make certain that any delegation to
school personnel is made directly by the prescribing physician.
C. Smith v. Robinson
A Supreme Court decision issued the same day as Tatro contributes
to the overall picture of the Court's attitude toward the conflicting
sides in EAHCA cases. In Smith v. Robinson,126 the Court held that
attorneys' fees are not available in actions to obtain an appropriate
state board of nursing ruling that prohibits school employees other than health
professionals from delivering health services. The ruling sets penalties for any
school administrators, principals, teachers, teachers' aides, secretaries, or clerical
personnel who violate the order. White, supmr note 117, at 26.
124. Nat'l School Bds. Ass'n Brief, supra note 90, at 33.
125. See supra note 123.
126. 104 S. Ct. 3457 (1984). Parents of a cerebral palsied child had been denied public
funding of the child's placement in a special education program at the state ad-
ministrative level. Whether claimants could obtain attorneys' fees by filing addi-
tional or independent claims under § 504 was a major issue argued by petitioners
and respondents in Tatro as well. See Note, supra note 65. The Court chose
Smith instead as the vehicle for settling confusion over the proper interplay
among the various statutory and constitutional bases for relief, and over the ef-
fect of that interplay on the provision of attorneys' fees. Petitioners in Smith had
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education for a handicapped child. The Court reasoned that when the
relief sought is, in fact, a grant under the EAHCA, which has no attor-
neys' fees provision, there can be no recourse to other federal statutes
simply to gain a fees award. 2 7 The majority also concluded that be-
cause the rights and remedies set forth in the EAHCA are so compre-
hensive, Congress did not intend to allow educational needs to be
obtained through independent claims under the more general federal
statues that permit fee payment, including § 504 of the Rehabilitation
Act,128 and 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and § 1988 of the Civil Rights Act.129
Assessment of attorneys' fees, whether as appropriate relief in an
made not only the § 504 and § 1983 claims made in Tatro, but also due process and
equal protection claims under the 14th amendment.
The decision in Smith is complex, and will be discussed in this article only for
what it contributes to a clarification of the Court's general stance toward the sub-
stantive and procedural provisions of the EAHCA.
127. Specifically, the Court stated:
The remedies, rights, and procedures Congress set out in the EHA are
the ones it intended to apply to a handicapped child's claim to a free
appropriate public education.... Congress did not intend a handi-
capped child to be able to circumvent the requirements or supplement
the remedies of the EHA by resort to the general antidiscrimination pro-
vision of § 504.
Smith v. Robinson, 104 S. Ct. 3457, 3473 (1984). The Court did not decide if Con-
gress also meant the EAHCA to bar constitutional due process claims to special
education.
128. Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, as amended by 29 U.S.C. § 794
(1982), states that: "No otherwise qualified handicapped individual ... shall,
solely by reason of his handicap, be excluded from the participation in, be denied
the benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination under any program or activity
receiving Federal financial assistance." 29 U.S.C. § 794a(b) (1982), states that:
"In any action or proceeding to enforce or charge a violation of a provision of this
subchapter, the court, in its discretion, may allow the prevailing party, other than
the United States, a reasonable attorneys' fee as a part of the costs." Petitioners
in Smith relied on 31 U.S.C. § 1244(e) (1976), now replaced by 31 U.S.C.
§ 6721(c)(2) (1982), which authorizes a civil action and assessment of attorneys'
fees to enforce § 504 against a state or local government receiving federal funds
under the State and Local Fiscal Assistance Act of 1972, 86 Stat. 919, amended by
90 Stat. 2341 (1976).
129. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (Supp. 1982) states:
Every person, who under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, cus-
tom or usage, of any State or Territory or the District of Columbia, sub-
jects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other
person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights,
privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be
liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other
proper proceeding for redress.
42 U.S.C. § 1988 (1982) provides:
In any action or proceeding to enforce a provision of sections, 1981, 1982,
1983, 1985, and 1986 of this title, title IX of Public Law 92-318 [20 U.S.C.
1681] or title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 [42 U.S.C. 2000d], the
court, in its discretion, may allow the prevailing party, other than the
United States a reasonable attorneys' fee as part of the costs.
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extreme case, or as mandated by Congress as part of a particular cause
of action, has been one means of discouraging acts deemed socially un-
desirable. The Court's preclusion of attorneys' fees in EAHCA actions
contributes to a pessism-istic outlook regarding progress toward en-
forceable rights for the handicapped. Parents considering an action
under the EAHCA now have a third reason to hesitate. To the Court's
restrictive interpretation of the EAHCA in Rowley, and its explicit
deference to professional opinions of state educational officials, has
been added the knowledge that attorneys' fees will not be available to
parents trying to enforce their child's right to an appropriate
education.130
With the Smith decision the Court turned an already difficult maze
of judicial and statutory rules into an absolute Catch 22 for parents of
handicapped children. One cannot expect a statute or court decision
to address specifically every possible factual situation that may occur
in the future. Statutes must be general, providing guidance in the
greatest number of factual situations that will arise under them. And
judicial propositions of law are bound by the facts of a case before the
court. 3 1 But when a statute's terms are as vague as those in the
EAHCA, and when the Court's interpretations provide as little gui-
dance for specific future situations as did Rowley and Tatro, then adju-
dication of the individual rights at stake will be necessary and should
certainly not be discouraged. The Court should not have limited the
opportunity of already disadvantaged individuals to find out what
services they are entitled to under the EAHCA by refusing to grant an
award of attorneys' fees. Children who found their access to the
schools limited will only be disadvantaged further by the resulting loss
of access to the courts.
Availability of fees would be an advantage to more than just the
family of a child seeking answers to questions regarding their own
rights. Increased adjudication of indvidual cases at this stage in the
history of the EAHCA would yield specific answers that Congress and
130. Smith v. Robinson, 104 S. Ct. 3457, 3468 (1984). The Court continued:
Allowing a plaintiff to circumvent the EHA administrative remedies
would be inconsistent with Congress' carefully tailored scheme....
We conclude, therefore, that where the EHA is available to a handi-
capped child asserting a right to a free appropriate public education,
based either on the EHA or on the Equal Protection Clause of the Four-
teenth Amendment, the EHA is the exclusive avenue through which the
child and his parents or guardian can pursue their claim.
Id. at 3470.
131. As the Court has noted: "We are acutely aware, however, that we sit to decide
concrete cases and not abstract propositions of law. We decline to lay down a
broad rule or series of rules to govern all conceivable future questions in this




the Court have to date been unable to give. Future problems could be
avoided for many more handicapped children and schools.
In order for the resolution system the EAHCA provides to be via-
ble, Congress should amend the statute with a provision granting at-
torneys' fees when the state has been shown to have infringed a
handicapped child's rights. Any other result is inconsistent with the
idea of a complete procedure for determining the special education
and services must provide, and with Congress's intent to guarantee
handicapped children both access to public schools and access to the
courts to resolve disputes.132
V. CONCLUSION
Parents and school officials attempting to predict the outcome of
an EAHCA action must balance all three of the Supreme Court's in-
terpretations of the EAHCA. The Tatro requirement that meaningful
access exist throughout the school day seems to expand the Rowley
standard of meaningful access primarily to achieve integration. The
rule in Tatro, however, affects only those handicapped children who
can otherwise be mainstreamed but who need health services to at-
tend a full day's classes. Ultimately, the gain in school nursing serv-
ices for the few affected will have a much smaller impact on
opportunities for handicapped individuals than will the loss of attor-
neys' fees in EAHCA actions.
In Tatro the Court had an opportunity to explain the delphic defi-
nitions given in its first attempt at explicating EAHCA provisions in
Rowley. Unfortunately, the guarantees of EAHCA are not yet func-
tionally clear. With attorneys' fees now unavailable, it may be some
time before the many remaining issues involved in applying the
EAHCA guarantees reach the Supreme Court for clarification.
Joyce Dickey Palomar, '86
132. Justice Brennan, joined by Justices Marshall and Stevens in dissent, concluded:
[T]he handicapped children of this country whose difficulties are com-
pounded by discrimination and by other deprivations of constitutional
rights will have to pay the costs. It is at best ironic that the Court has
managed to impose this burden on handicapped children in the course of
interpreting a statute wholly intended to promote the educational rights
of those children.
Id. at 3479 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
The assistant attorney general who argued the case for Rhode Island stated
that after the Smith ruling attorneys' fees in special edcuation cases will be trig-
gered only by civil rights violations that are not addressed in the EAHCA. School
Law News, July 13, 1984, at 2.
[Vol. 64:509
